Calcium Hydroxide in Simulated Lateral Canal Filling

Calcium Hydroxide in Simulated Lateral Canal Filling Aim: The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of calcium hydroxide dressing on the filling of simulated lateral canals by different obturation techniques. Materials and Methods: Sixty single root premolars were instrumented. Simulated lateral canals were drilled on each third of the roots. The teeth were divided into four groups: no dressing and obturation by lateral condensation technique (G1), dressing with calcium hydroxide and obturation by lateral condensation technique (G2), no dressing and obturation by hybrid technique (G3) and, dressing with calcium hydroxide and obturation by hybrid technique (G4). The teeth were maintained at 37oC in 100% humidity for seven days, and obturation techniques were performed. Radiographs were taken and lateral canals filled or unfilled were counted. Data were analyzed using ANOVA followed by Tukey’s test (ÃŽ ±=5%). Results: The hybrid technique filled large number of lateral canals compared to lateral condensation technique , regardless the use of intracanal medication (PPPConclusion: Regardless the obturation technique, calcium hydroxide dressing reduced the penetration of filling material in simulated lateral canals. Clinical significance: The persistence of calcium hydroxide residues reduces the penetration of filling material in simulated lateral canals, possibly representing a potential cause of failure in the future. Keywords: Calcium hydroxide, Endodontics, root canal obturation, laboratory research Introduction The root canal system has a very complex anatomy, characterized mainly by the presence of curvatures, accessory and lateral canals.1-3 The lateral canals can be observed anywhere along the root length of an important percentage of teeth, although more commonly in the apical third.1 Actually, the presence of lateral canals represents a challenge, as they are difficult to reach, clean, disinfect and fill during endodontic treatment,4 representing a potential cause of diseases.3,5-8 Considering that persisting bacteria may be located in not accessed areas like lateral canals, the intracanal medication and three-dimensional obturation of the root system becomes extremely important.4 The intracanal medication has been used to complete the disinfection and to prevent reinfection by these microorganisms,9-11 and can act chemically by killing microorganisms or physically by preventing bacterial penetration.12 The obturation also could prevent reinfection13 as the sealer isolates microorganisms without access to space and nutrients.14 Calcium hydroxide has been widely used as an intracanal medication for its antibacterial effect on most of the microorganisms identified in the root canal system.12 The therapeutic properties of this medication are associated with their pH value and with the period that they remain within the root canals.9,15 It has been pointed out that calcium hydroxide dressing for seven days with subsequent instrumentation and irrigation with sodium hypochlorite, improve the debridement of the root canal system and efficiently eliminate persistent bacteria.16,17 However, it was found that a considerable amount of calcium hydroxide paste remains attached to the root canal after instrumentation and irrigation with various solutions.18-20 Also, it is known that when calcium hydroxide is incompletely removed from the root canal, the residue compromises the endodontic sealing.20,21 Thus, it is possible that residual calcium hydroxide could obliterate the openings of the lateral canals, blocking their filling.19,22 Additionally, the type of obturation technique is a crucial factor to be considered in such situations, since the capability to ensure the filling of lateral canals is an important clinical parameter and may represent a favorable aspect of the filling technique. In this context, the aim of this in vitro study was to evaluate the influence of calcium hydroxide dressing on the filling of simulated lateral canals by different obturation techniques. Materials and Methods The study has been approved by an ethical committee from Pontifà ­cia Universidade Catà ³lica do Paranà ¡, under number of register 326/2004. Only one researcher has done the experimental procedures. Sample preparation In this in vitro study, a total of sixty human single root mandibular premolars with medium length between 21 to 23 mm were selected. The teeth were autoclaved and stored in 0.5% thymol solution prior to the experimental assays. The coronal access was gained with a #2 round and a #3080 diamond bur (KG Sorensen, Barueri, SP, Brazil). Then, the coronal and middle thirds of the root canal were shaped using #1, #2, and #3 Gates-Glidden drills (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland). The canal length was visually established by placing a #10 K-file (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland) in each root canal until it was seen emerging through the apical foramen. The working length was determined by subtracting 1 mm from this measurement. The teeth were instrumented at the working length using a #35 K-File (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland). Simulated lateral canals Three simulated lateral canals were drilled on the mesial and distal surfaces (one in each third: coronal, middle and apical) by using a device. This device consisted by a #10 K-File (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland) with 4 mm from its tip sectioned, which was adapted in a low-speed contra-angle handpiece. The root canals were then instrumented using a #45 K-File (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland) to the working length to create a smear layer. After every change of file size and at the completion of instrumentation, the canals were irrigated with 5 mL of a 1% sodium hypochlorite solution. Following this, the root canal was irrigated with 5 mL of 17% ethylene diaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA) (Merck Brasil, Sà £o Paulo, SP, Brazil) followed by a final flush of distilled water. The root canals were dried with paper points (Tanariman Manufacturer, Amazonas, AM, Brazil). Experimental groups Afterwards, the sixty teeth were randomly divided into four equal groups of fifteen. The groups were separated according to the use or not of calcium hydroxide dressing, and the type of obturation technique, as follow: no dressing and obturation by lateral condensation technique (G1), dressing with calcium hydroxide and obturation by lateral condensation (G2), no dressing and obturation by Tagger’s hybrid technique (G3) and, dressing with calcium hydroxide and obturation by Tagger’s hybrid technique (G4). Dressing procedure In G2 and G4, the calcium hydroxide paste was prepared by mixing two parts of lab grade calcium hydroxide and 1 mL saline solution to obtain a creamy consistency. The paste was inserted using a #25 Lentulo drill (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland), subtracting 2 mm from the working length. The access cavities were temporarily sealed with a cotton pellet and temporary seal (Coltosol, Coletene, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil). The samples were maintained at 37oC in 100% humidity for seven days. Afterwards, the temporary seal was removed and the calcium hydroxide was cleaned using a #35 K-File (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland) and irrigation with 1% sodium hypochlorite solution and 17% EDTA (Merck Brasil, Sà £o Paulo, SP, Brazil). The root canals were dried with paper points (Tanariman Manufacturer, Amazonas, AM, Brazil). Obturation techniques For obturation procedures, the AH Plus sealer (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland) was used in all groups. The sealer was manipulated according with manufacturer’s instructions. The obturation technique was performed as follow. Lateral condensation For G1 and G2, it was used the lateral condensation technique. For this, a well-fitting master gutta-percha cone #35 (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland) coated with sealer was taken up 1 mm from the working length. Then, the master cone was left seated and the lateral condensation was performed using a finger spreader B (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland). This spreader was inserted with the sealer toward the canal’s wall and then counterclock wisely removed to create room for the insertion of the accessory gutta-percha cones (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland). This procedure was repeated until the insertion of new accessory cones was not possible. After the obturation completion, the excess of filling material was removed and the cold vertical condensation was executed. Tagger’s hybrid technique For G3 and G4, it was used the Tagger’s hybrid technique. For this, a master cone was seated as described above. An initial lateral condensation was performed with the finger spreader B (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland), and one accessory gutta-percha cone was inserted. Next, a McSpadden compactor #70 (Dentsply Maillefer, Ballaigues, Switzerland) was coupled to a low-speed contra-angle handpiece and introduced passively into the root canal. The penetration of the condenser inside root canal was obtained with the aid of a rubber marker 1 mm short of the working length. With the condenser inside the root canal, next to the gutta-percha cones, it was driven by forward and backward movements up to reach working length, staying in that position for about 1 second. The condenser was removed from root canal with the motor still driven with gentle pressure on one side of the canal’s wall. Following, the vertical condensation of the plasticized gutta-percha was perfo rmed through heat Paiva’s condensers in order to obtain a better adaptation of the filling material. Postoperative radiographs Immediately after filling, postoperative radiographs were taken and all of them were identically exposed, developed, and fixed. The radiographs were placed in slide mounts and projected in order to count the lateral canals filled or unfilled in each group. Only completely filled lateral canals were considered. Three calibrated examiners analyzed the images. Statistical analysis Data were statistically analyzed by the SAS/LAB package (SAS Software, version 9.0; SAS Institute Inc., Cary, USA). Firstly, Kappa’s test was performed to evaluate the examiner’s level of agreement. The assumptions of equality of variances and normal distribution of errors were checked and the data were transformed as suggested by the software. The simulated lateral canals were analyzed using three-way ANOVA followed by Tukey HSD test, considering the dressing, obturation technique and root thirds as study factors. The significance level was set at 5%. Results The value of the test of agreement between examiners was 0.89. In Figure 1, it is observed representative radiographs after obturation by different techniques. The Tagger’s hybrid technique filled large number of simulated lateral canals compared to the lateral condensation technique, regardless the use of intracanal medication (PP Although the coronal and apical thirds had a somewhat larger number of filled lateral canals than the middle third, this difference was not statistically significant (P>0.05) (Table 1). Significant differences were observed when comparing the number of filled and unfilled canals in the same root third of each group (PP>0.05). Discussion After shaping and cleaning the root canal, persisting bacteria may be located in not accessed areas like lateral canals, and this must be considered potentially pathogenic and a cause of future endodontic failure.3,5-8 For this reason, dressing and three-dimensional obturation of the root canal system becomes important steps.4 The use of calcium hydroxide dressing is established in the literature,23 however, persistence of this medication in the root canal walls could prevent the sealer penetration into the dentinal tubules,21 compromising the obturation procedure. Also, several techniques have been developed to achieve an adequate three-dimensional obturation of lateral canals.24 For this, we purposed to evaluate the influence of calcium hydroxide dressing on the filling of simulated lateral canals by different obturation techniques. The actual need to fill lateral canals has been a largely discussed in the current literature.2,4,19 However, it is important to point out that both lateral canals and apical ramifications have been implicated with treatment failure when they are sufà ¯Ã‚ ¬Ã‚ ciently large to harbor signià ¯Ã‚ ¬Ã‚ cant numbers of bacteria and to provide these bacteria with access to the periradicular tissues.3,25 Therefore, disinfection, dressing and filling of lateral canals in cases of pulp necrosis and apical and/or lateral periodontitis should be considered important goals of the treatment, although difà ¯Ã‚ ¬Ã‚ cult to achieve.3 Calcium hydroxide is widely used as an intracanal medication,12 and several techniques have been used to remove it from the root canal.18,21,26,27 The enlargement of the canal to the next file size and copious irrigation with sodium hypochlorite and/or EDTA, which are the procedures commonly used in clinical practice, seems to be unable in completely remove calcium hydroxide from root canal.21,26 There is a consensus that the residues of the medicament persists in the canal even with different techniques for removal.28,29 The results of our study demonstrated that residual calcium hydroxide blocked the openings of the lateral canals, reducing and/or preventing the penetration of sealer or gutta-percha into the lateral canals, corroborating with a previous study.19 Regardless the obturation technique, we demonstrated that when calcium hydroxide was applied as a dressing medication (G2 + G4), 99 of the 180 simulated lateral canals were obturated. On the other hand, when calcium hydroxide was not used (G1 + G3), 129 of the 180 simulated lateral canals were filled. Also, in our study, simulated lateral canals were created in each third of the canal root. We showed that no differences were found among the different root thirds in the same group. About the ability of different obturation techniques to fill simulated lateral canals the literature indicates that warm gutta-percha techniques are superior.2 According to our results, the Tagger’s hybrid technique resulted in large number of filled simulated lateral canals, although it was reduced with the dressing with calcium hydroxide. Also, the lateral condensation showed the worst ability in filling simulated lateral canals, particularly when calcium hydroxide dressing was employed. It is possible that the cold condensation of gutta-percha difficult the penetration of the filling material.30 Thermoplasticized techniques improve the expansion of the material against the dentinal walls.31 A recent study about the interference of calcium hydroxide previous to the filling revealed that the medication can difficult the hermetic filling of the root canal system because of its property of obliterates lateral canals.22 Overall, the persistence of calcium hydroxide residues should be considered as a side effect when selecting this medication as an interappointment dressing in root canal therapy,19,22 regardless the obturation technique to be employed. Conclusions Regardless the obturation technique, calcium hydroxide dressing reduced the penetration of filling material in simulated lateral canals. Clinical significance The persistence of calcium hydroxide residues reduces the penetration of filling material in simulated lateral canals, possibly representing a potential cause of failure in the future. 1

To Kill a Mockingbird - Southern Traditions :: Free Essay Writer

To Kill a Mockingbird - Southern Traditions The South has always been known for its farming economy, confederate tendencies, family pride, and delicate females in ruffled dresses. In the book To Kill A Mockingbird, by Harper Lee, the South's familiar traditions become ostensible as a theme throughout the plot. This novel takes place in Alabama in the 1930s and tells a story about a lawyer who defends a wrongly accused black man while trying to raise his two children, Scout and Jem, as they go through life's most active learning stage. Southern ways enhance the plot of the story and give a realistic and historic perspective to the book. This portrayal of Southern culture appears in various forms of racism, hatred, meek women, and family. The Southern women were told and obligated, by some code of southern conduct, to mature into fair-smelling, perfect "ladies." By "ladies" they meant women who were well mannered, good at embroidery, and wore frilly, lacy dresses. One example of this southern tradition occurs when Aunt Alexandra comes to the Finch residence to help Atticus raise his children during the trial. When first arriving she says to Scout, "We decided that it would be best for you to have some feminine influence. It won't be many years, Jean Louise, before you become interested in clothes and boys." This comment implies that the only subjects girls are expected to understand are boys and clothes. Aunt Alexandra makes no mention of Jean Louise's intelligence, education, or personality. Her diction suggests that the only thing Jean Louise is capable of pursuing is her attire and a man. Scout discovers what a "southern lady" is as she notices how Aunt Alexandra "chose protective garments that drew up her bosom to giddy heights, pinched in her waist, flared out her rear, and managed to suggest that Aunt Alexandra's was once an hour-glass figure." Scout was considered to be very improper, wearing overalls and pants, but Aunt Alexandra would still try and introduce her to other ladies. I assume that she did this to try and influence Scout. She hoped Scout would form lady-like habits by watching others. Another example takes place after the trial, when Jem is appalled at the decision the court makes in response to Tom Robinson's case.

Driving Force of Regionalism Essay

To what extent and in what ways have the driving forces of regionalism in South-east Asia changed since the end of the Cold War? Regionalism has become a trend in many regions of the world. Among them, Europe, North America and Asia (Asia Pacific region) are crucial ones. Some observers argue that the world order have been divided between these three regions with the existence of the European Union (EU), the North American Free trade Agreement (NFTA) and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This divergent part of the world requires comprehensive realization to make sense of how they have developed throughout history. In particular, writing the history of Southeast Asia remains a challenge as it involves the understanding of ‘societies that often took quite different view of the past †¦(and) a region where the implications of that historical tradition may have a political significance’[1]. Clapham notes that it is even more challenging to analyse foreign policy making in Southeast Asia region[2]. The early 1970’s was a significant period for the states in this region as i t was during this time that five countries decided to join together and define their position in the Cold War between two superpowers and claimed their neutrality. The fact that ASEAN has come up with such a policy is interesting to look at as it gives not only an insight of the driving forces of regionalism in Southeast Asia but also how these developing states saw themselves and formulate their foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. This paper aims to analyse ASEAN’s behaviour in order to access to what extent regionalism has changed since the end of Cold War in Southeast Asia. In that, regionalism would be conceived as ‘a state-led or states-led project designed to reorganize a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines’[3]. The discussion is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the useful theoretical insights of security community to explain why ASEAN states cooperate in the midst of new security challenge in the region. The second part identifies the diplomacy of ASEAN during the post-Cold War period. Given the confine of this paper, the discussion specifically examines the event of the Spratly Islands and the creation of ARF. In the concluding section, achievements and prospects for ASEAN will be addressed. The central argument that this paper advance is that regionalism in Southeast Asia has changed and the changes have been  driven and constrained by the security condition during the post-Cold War era where a regional power vacuum is found. ASEAN emerged from the Cold War as a regional organization in 1967. With the accession of Cambodia, it seemed to be fulfilling the aspirations of its founding fathers to expand membership to include all ten Southeast Asian countries. However, with the end of Cold War and the settlement of Cambodian conflict, ASEAN is facing a new challenge related to issues of security and stability in the post-Cold War regional environment[4]. According to the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, the goal of ASEAN is to ‘accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region; to safeguard the political and economic stability of the region against big power rivalry; and to serve as a forum for the resolution of intra-regional differences’[5]. The formation of ASEAN should be seen as a means of maintaining peace and stability by providing a forum for the discussion and resolution of regional issues relating to security. There are indeed a number of incidents to show that security issue is the major concern of ASEAN such as the call for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and ASEAN’s role in the Cambodian conflict in the 1980s. However, with the end of Cold War, ASEAN faced a new challenge to its goal when the security environment of South-east Asia was transformed by the change from the old bipolar Cold War security system to the new emerging multipolar system. The new power pattern in the region forced the ASEAN states to cooperate as they realized the security could be in danger if they do not collaborate to improve the situation. This kind of behaviour of the ASEAN states can be best explained by Deutsch’s discussion of security communities. This was especially evident in the study of regional integration and some scholars argued that the concept of security community provides the most useful framework to analyze ASEAN regionali sm. According to Deutsch, a security community is a group that has become integrated and accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices in order to assure peaceful change among members of a group over a long period of time[6]. Essentially, members within the community retain their independence and sovereignty. The two attributes of such a community are marked by the absence of war and organized violence. To be more specific, as  Yalem notes, a regional security community is a group of states which have ‘renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflicts’[7]. Deutsch further adds that there should be no contingency planning or war-oriented resource mobilization against other members within a security community. This could be acted as an indicator of whether states have developed ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’[8]. Furthermore, whether a security community has been achieved can actually ‘be tested operationally in terms of the absence or presence of significant organized preparations for was or larger-scale violence among its members’[9]. When applying the concept of security communities into the study of regionalism, it is import ant to make a distinction between security community and a security regime. Buzan defines security regime as ‘a group of states cooperate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their assumptions about the behaviour of others’[10]. Although this seems similar to the concept of security community, there is a major difference in that a security regime refers to a situation where the interests of the actors are both not wholly compatible and competitive. Thus, the resulting relationship is rather hostile and the use of force is hindered only by a balance of power[11]. In comparison, a security community is based ‘on a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among the actors regarding the avoidance of war’[12]. In this context, ASEAN regionalism is more likely to be conceptualized as the process of building the security community rather than the latter. Although a security community seems to be constructed on the ground of interests and identities rather than the idea of common threat, recent literature sketched by Adler and Barnett stress that a security community can actually be triggered by common threat such as ‘cataclysmic events’[13]. As Adler puts it, the concept of a community is ‘the idea that actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interests, diffuse reciprocity and trust, strikes fear’[14]. Furthermore, Hurrell attempts to suggest a series of approaches to study contemporary regionalism. He notes that cooperative arrangements in regional cooperation could serve a number of purposes ‘on the one hand, they can serve as a means of responding to external challenges and of coordinating regional positions  in international institutions or negotiating forums. On the other, they can be developed to secure welfare gains, to promote common values or to solve common problems arising from increased levels of regional interdependence. In the security field, for example, such cooperation can range from the stabilization of a regional balance of power, to the institutionalization of confidence -building measures, to the negotiation of a region-wide security regime.’[15] The concept of security community can be applied to explain the creation and the behaviour of ASEAN. During the time of the Cold War, great power rivalries between the Soviet Union and the US in the region has turned Southeast Asia into a battleground with the regional states being used by the opponents with the attempt to create blocs which support their positions or ideologies in the war. Simultaneously, many states in the region have been oppressed by external powers for centuries and not being treated as a respectable actor in the international agenda. Facing with the same hardship, therefore, they came together and create a region free from external interference. However, with the end of Cold War, the security order in this region is characterized by new factors of conflict and instability and ‘regional policy-makers have expressed misgivings about the strategic uncertainties and conflict-creation potential of a post-Cold War order at the regional level’[16]. Among the regional powers, China, Japan and India are generally being seen as the three leading contenders for influence[17]. For some, the involvement of US in the region as the balance of power is still desirable and the possibility of its withdrawal remains a major worry of the region’s stability[18]. In fact, there are a number of unsolved tensions in the region and most of them revolve around China’s strategic ambitions such as its claims for the Spartly Islands. In responding to the new challenge, the ASEAN states have to reconsider and adjust some of the assumptions and principles underlying ASEAN regionalism in order to contribute to regional security and order embedded in the 1992 Singapore Declaration. In order to examine in what ways the driving forces of regionalism in South-east Asia have changed since the end of the Cold War, it is essential to look at some case studies of ASEAN’s post-Cold War diplomacy: China’s claims for the Spratly Islands and ASEAN’s response Situated in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands consists of islets and reefs with suspected deposits of oil and gas[19]. The disputes involve China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Many worried that the dispute will turn into a potential source of armed conflict involving ASEAN members particularly because ‘the likelihood of any agreement on the joint development of the islands involving all the claimants, as proposed by some regional policy-makers and analysts, has limited plausibility’[20]. In view of this, other ASEAN members initiated efforts to address the security issue which was seen as a destabilizing force in the region in the post-Cold War period. Finally in 1989, it was Indonesia alone launched the South China Sea Workshop (SCSW)[21] to promote peaceful settlement of the dispute by emphasizing the lessons of Cambodian conflict and the lessons from ASEAN regional c ooperation. Although the workshop has been extended to include China, Vietnam and Laos in 1991, there were no collective ASEAN position or action on the dispute. The irony lies on the fact that ‘the Spratly seminars are a unilateral Indonesian initiative, resulting from diplomacy not by ASEAN or even a group within ASEAN but by one member country’[22]. The regional community sense was missing in this incident particularly because Malaysia and the Philippines feared that multilateral forum could lessen their negotiating ability thus making bilateral settlements impossible. As a result, they were not willing to support ASEAN to settle the dispute involving other member states[23]. This indicates their determination to uphold national autonomy and also their perspective to view ASEAN only as a confidence-building forum rather than a regional community[24]. Consequently in 1992, China passed a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China. The aim of this legislation is for China to formalize far-reaching claims in the South China Sea. The assertiveness of China caused doubt over the effectiveness of the previous launched workshops and made ASEAN members realized that China insisted on unilateral means to solve the problem. ASEAN responded to China’s claims with the ‘ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea’ issued in the same year. The Declaration emphasized the need to ‘resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means  without resort to force’ and it urged all parties ‘to exercise constraint’[25]. It has been pointed out that ASEAN has claimed some success by placing the dispute on the agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) with the support of intense lobbying[26]. At the same time, ASEAN has been criticized for failing to negotiate codes of conduct in that China continued to carry on its bilateral agreement with Vietnam in 1993 and Philippines in 1995[27]. However, in a bigger picture, it made clear that all AS EAN members has developed a respect for the codes of conduct enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation on issues relating to peaceful settlement of conflicts and the non-use of force. Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) The ASEAN Summit of 1992 declared that ‘ASEAN shall seek avenues to engage Member States in new areas of cooperation in security matters’, therefore, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1993 which ‘serves as a multilateral consultative forum aimed at promoting preventive diplomacy and confidence building among the states in the Asia-Pacific region’[28]. Through the ARF, ASEAN hoped to create regional order based on its own norms as well as the new norm of inclusiveness which is essential to cooperative security[29]. In this content, the ARF provided a test of ASEAN’s norms as the membership of ARF included all the major powers of the international system whereby the regional order in this region would also base on the inclusive approach meaning that the major powers would engage in the management of regional order. In 1995, the Philippines discovered the incident of Mischief Reef by China while ASEAN responded by issuing a joint statement criticizing China[30]. It seems this stand of ASEAN fulfils the idea of community, however, it is only a partial fulfillment due to the fact that the ASEAN members have different interpretations of the conflict. ASEAN consensus is always revolved around the norms of peaceful settlement of conflict which is being seen as the guarantee for stability. However, they did not identify with the position of the Philippines, for instance, Thailand considered the dispute as bilateral and not a dispute between ASEAN and China. Again, the event actually put a test on the ASEAN member’s ability to come up with a collective position. As Malik comments on the future of the Southeast Asia regionalism, he points out that to maintain  peace in the region, it is ‘not only founded on the stability of a balance but is sourced in a sense of shared aspirations and common destiny’[31]. In view of this, the lack of consensus among ASEAN member states indicated their unwillingness to demand standards of behaviour from China which only reinforced the ASEAN’s partial fulfillment as a community. In general, the post-Cold War period has posed unleashing of conflicts in the Asia Pacific region which were effectively suppressed during the colonial era and the subsequent period of superpower rivalry[32]. With the end of bipolarity, there is a greater potential of conflict. This paper has examined ASEAN’s behaviour in security affairs during the post-Cold War ear with the objective of assessing the validity of the idea of community. Many scholars have widely acknowledged ASEAN’s potential to become a regional security community from both within and outside the region. Snitwongse notes that although ASEAN may not be able to fully achieve self-reliance, its most striking achievement has been community building[33]. Simon claims that ASEAN is perhaps a security community in which no member would consider the use of force against each other to settle disputes[34]. In the aftermath of the end of Cold War, the absence of war among the ASEAN members is indeed being recognized by many as a great achievement. Based on the discussion of this paper, it has proved that ASEAN has developed some of the attributes of what Adler and Barnett call it as a ‘nascent security community’ where a number of triggering mechanisms including threat perceptions, shared identity and organizational emulation are present. After three decades of progress in promoting peaceful intra-regional order, ASEAN faced its greatest challenge since the end of Cold War as the current regional security environment remains in a state of uncertainty. Nonetheless, the prospect of a regional power vacuum implies the possibility of ASEAN’s further progress while the question remains whether ASEAN itself can fill the security gap by mobilizing its collective diplomatic and political resources. Bibliography Acharya, A., A New Regional Order In South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 279, London, 1993 Acharya, A., Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order, London, 2001 Adler, E & Barnett, M., ‘A framework for the study of security communities’, in Adler, E. & Barnett, M (eds.) Security Communities, Cambridge, 1998 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN: An Overview, Jakarta, 1995 Buszynski, L., ‘Declining Superpowers: The Impact on ASEAN’, Pacific Review, 3/3, 1990 Buzan, B., People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, New York, 1991 Catley, B. & Keliat, M., Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea, Aldershot, 1997 Deutsch, K.W., ‘Security Communities’, in Rosenau, J (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York, 1961 Dewitt, D.B., ‘Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security’, Pacific Review, 7/1, 1994 Haacke, J., ‘Seeking Influence: China’s Diplomacy Toward ASEAN After the Asian Crisis’, Asian Perspective, 26/4, 2002 Hill, C., ‘Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries’, in Clapham, C. (ed.) Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach, Farnborough, 1977 Hurell, A., ‘Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics’, Review of International Studies, 21/4, 1995 Leifer, M., The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper 302, London, 1996 Payne, A. & Gamble A., Regionalism and World Order, London, 1996 Simon, S., ‘The Regionalization of Defence in Southeast Asia’, Pacific Review, 5/2, 1992 Snitwongse, K., ‘Meeting the Challenges of Changing Southeast Asia’, in Scalapino, R., Sato, S. & Han, S.J. (eds.) Regional Dynamics: Security, Political and Economic Issues in the Asia Pacific Region, Jakarta, 1990 Tarling, N., Southeast Asia: A Modern History, Oxford, 2001 Tow, W.T., Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security, New York, 2001 Whiting, A.S., ‘ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension’, Asian Survey, 37/4, 1997 Yalem, R.J., ‘Regional Security Communities’, in Keeton, G.W. & Scharzenberger, G. (eds.) The Yearbook of International Affairs, London, 1979

Kublai Khan and the Mongols Invasions of Japan

The Mongol Invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281 devastated Japanese resources and power in the region, nearly destroying the samurai culture and Empire of Japan entirely before a typhoon miraculously spared their last stronghold. Although Japan started the war between the two rival empires with hefty troops of honorable samurai, the sheer force and brute strength of their Mongol invaders pushed the noble warriors to their limits, making them question their very code of honor in facing these fierce combatants. The impact of nearly two decades of struggle between their rulers would echo on throughout Japanese history, even through the Second World War and the very culture of modern-day Japan. Precursor to Invasion In 1266, the Mongol ruler  Kublai Khan  (1215–1294) paused in his campaign to subdue all of  China, and sent a message to the Emperor of Japan, whom he addressed as the ruler of a small country, and advised the Japanese sovereign to pay him tribute at once—or else. The Khans emissaries returned from Japan without an answer. Five times over the next six years, Kublai Khan sent his messengers; the Japanese  shogun  would not allow them even to land on Honshu, the main island.   In 1271, Kublai Khan defeated the Song Dynasty and declared himself the first emperor of Chinas Yuan Dynasty. A grandson of Genghis Khan, he ruled over much of China plus Mongolia and Korea; meanwhile, his uncles and cousins controlled an empire that stretched from Hungary in the west to the Pacific coast of Siberia in the east. The great khans of the Mongol Empire did not tolerate impudence from their neighbors, and Kublai was quick to demand a strike against  Japan  as early as 1272. However, his counselors advised him to bide his time until a proper armada of warships could be built—300 to 600, vessels which would be commissioned from the shipyards of southern China and Korea, and an army of some 40,000 men. Against this mighty force, Japan could muster only about 10,000 fighting men from the ranks of the often-squabbling samurai clans. Japans warriors were seriously outmatched. The First Invasion, 1274 From the port of Masan in southern Korea, the Mongols and their subjects launched a step-wise attack on Japan in the autumn of 1274. Hundreds of large ships and an even larger number of small boats—estimated between 500 and 900 in number—set out into the Sea of Japan. First, the invaders seized the islands of Tsushima and Iki about halfway between the tip of the Korean peninsula and the main islands of Japan. Quickly overcoming desperate resistance from the islands approximately 300 Japanese residents, the Mongol troops slaughtered them all and sailed on to the east. On November 18, the Mongol armada reached Hakata Bay, near the present-day city of Fukuoka on the island of Kyushu. Much of our knowledge about the details of this invasion comes from a scroll which was commissioned by the samurai Takezaki Suenaga (1246–1314), who fought against the Mongols in both campaigns. Japans Military Weaknesses Suenaga relates that the samurai army set out to fight according to their code of bushido; a warrior would step out, announce his name and lineage, and prepare for one-on-one combat with a foe. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the Mongols were not familiar with the code. When a lone samurai stepped forward to challenge them, the Mongols would simply attack him en masse, much like ants swarming a beetle. To make matters worse for the Japanese, the Yuan forces also used poison-tipped arrows, catapult-launched explosive shells, and a shorter bow that was accurate at twice the range of the samurais longbows. In addition, the Mongols fought in units, rather than each man for himself. Drumbeats relayed the orders guiding their precisely coordinated attacks. All of this was new to the samurai—often fatally so. Takezaki Suenaga and the three other warriors from his household were all unhorsed in the fighting, and each sustained serious wounds that day. A late charge by over 100 Japanese reinforcements was all that saved Suenaga and his men. The injured samurai drew back a few miles from the bay for the night, determined to renew their nearly hopeless defense in the morning. As night fell, a driving wind and heavy rain began to lash the coast. Close Call with Domination Unbeknownst to the Japanese defenders, the Chinese and Korean sailors on board Kublai Khans ships were busy persuading the Mongolian generals to let them weigh anchor and head further out to sea. They worried that the strong wind and high surf would drive their ships aground in Hakata Bay. The Mongols relented, and the great Armada sailed out into open waters—straight into the arms of an approaching typhoon. Two days later, a third of the Yuan ships lay on the bottom of the Pacific, and perhaps 13,000 of Kublai Khans soldiers and sailors had drowned. The battered survivors limped home, and Japan was spared the Great Khans dominion—for the time being.  While Kublai Khan sat at his capital in Dadu (modern-day Beijing) and brooded over his fleets misfortunes, the samurai waited for the  bakufu  in Kamakura to reward them for their valor, but that reward never came. Uneasy Peace: The Seven-year Interlude Traditionally, the bakufu gave a land grant to noble warriors at the end of battle so they could relax in times of peace. However, in the case of the invasion, there were no spoils to dole out—the invaders came from outside of  Japan,  and left no booty behind so the  bakufu  had no way to pay the thousands of samurai who had fought to fend off the Mongols. Takezaki Suenaga took the unusual step of traveling for two months to the  Ã¢â‚¬â€¹Kamakura shoguns  court to plead his case in person. Suenaga was rewarded with a prize horse and stewardship of a Kyushu island estate for his pains. Of the estimated 10,000  samurai warriors who fought, only 120 received any reward at all. This did not endear the Kamakura government to the vast majority of the samurai, to say the least. Even as Suenaga was making his case, Kublai Khan sent a six-man delegation to demand that the Japanese emperor  travel  to Dadu and kowtow to him. The Japanese responded by beheading the Chinese diplomats, a terrible infringement of the Mongol law against abusing emissaries. Then Japan prepared for a second attack. The leaders of Kyushu took a census of all available warriors and weaponry. In addition, Kyushus landowning class was given the task of building a defensive wall around Hakata Bay, five to fifteen feet high and 25 miles long. Construction took five years with each landholder responsible for a section of the wall proportional to the size of his estate. Meanwhile, Kublai Khan established a new government division called the Ministry for Conquering Japan. In 1980, the ministry devised plans for a two-pronged attack the following spring, to crush the recalcitrant Japanese once and for all. The Second Invasion, 1281 In the spring of 1281, the Japanese got word that a second Yuan invasion force was coming their way. The waiting samurai sharpened their swords and prayed to Hachiman, the Shinto god of war, but Kublai Khan was determined to smash Japan this time and he knew that his defeat seven years earlier had simply been bad luck, due more to the weather than to any extraordinary fighting prowess of the samurai. With more forewarning of this second attack, Japan was able to muster 40,000 samurai and other fighting men. They assembled behind the defensive wall at Hakata Bay, their eyes trained to the west. The Mongols sent two separate forces this time—an impressive force of 900 ships containing 40,000 Korean, Chinese, and Mongol troops set out from Masan, while an even larger force of 100,000 sailed from southern China in 3,500 ships. The Ministry for Conquering Japans plan called for an overwhelming coordinated attack from the combined imperial Yuan fleets. The Korean fleet reached Hakata Bay on June 23, 1281, but the ships from China were nowhere to be seen. The smaller division of the Yuan army was unable to breach the Japanese defensive wall, so a stationary battle evolved. Samurai weakened their opponents by rowing out to the Mongol ships in small boats under cover of darkness, setting fire to the ships and attacking their troops, and then rowing back to land. These night-time raids demoralized the Mongols conscripts, some of whom had only recently been conquered and had no love for the emperor. A stalemate between the evenly-matched foes lasted for 50 days, as the Korean fleet waited for the expected Chinese reinforcements. On August 12, the Mongols main fleet landed to the west of Hakata Bay. Now faced with a force more than three times as large as their own, the samurai were in serious danger of being overrun and slaughtered. With little hope of  survival—and little thought of reward if they triumphed—the Japanese samurai fought on with desperate bravery. Japans Miracle They say that truth is stranger than fiction, and in this case, its certainly true. Just when it appeared that the samurai would be exterminated and Japan crushed under the Mongol yoke, an incredible, miraculous event took place. On August 15, 1281, a second typhoon roared ashore at Kyushu. Of the khans 4,400 ships, only a few hundred rode out the towering waves and vicious winds. Nearly all of the invaders drowned in the storm, and those few thousand who made it to shore were hunted and killed without mercy by the samurai with very few returning to tell the tale at Dadu. The Japanese believed that their gods had sent the storms to preserve Japan from the Mongols. They called the two storms  kamikaze, or divine winds. Kublai Khan seemed to agree that Japan was protected by supernatural forces, thus abandoning the idea of conquering the island nation. The Aftermath For the Kamakura  bakufu, however, the outcome was disastrous. Once again the samurai demanded payment for the three months theyd spent warding off the Mongols. In addition, this time the priests who had prayed for divine protection added their own payment demands, citing the typhoons as evidence of the effectiveness of their prayers. The  bakufu  still had little to dispense, and what disposable riches they had  were given to the priests, who held more influence in the capital than the samurai. Suenaga did not even try to seek payment, instead commissioning the scroll where most modern understandings of this period come from as a record of his own accomplishments during both invasions. Dissatisfaction with the Kamakura  bakufu  festered among the ranks of the samurai over the following decades. When a strong emperor, Go-Daigo (1288–1339), rose in 1318 and challenged the authority of the  bakufu, the samurai refused to rally to the military leaders defense. After a complex civil war lasting 15 years, the Kamakura  bakufu  was defeated and the Ashikaga Shogunate assumed power over Japan. The Ashikaga family and all the other samurai passed down the story of the kamikaze, and Japans warriors drew strength and inspiration from the legend for centuries. As late as  World War II  from 1939 to 1945, Japanese imperial troops invoked the kamikaze in their battles against the Allied forces in the Pacific and its story still influences the natures culture to this day. Sources and Further Information Miyawaki–okada, Junko. The Japanese Origin of the Chinggis Khan Legends. 8.1 (2006): 123.  Narangoa, Li. Japanese Geopolitics and the Mongol Lands, 1915–1945. 3.1 (2004): 45.  Neumann, J. Great Historical Events That Were Significantly Affected by the Weather: I. The Mongol Invasions of Japan. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 56.11 (1975): 1167-71.